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A War on Two Fronts: 
Race, Citizenship, and the Segregation of 
the Blood Supply during World War II
Joshua Jordan
 Human blood carries with it much more than cells, plate-
lets, and plasma—it is a substance of  intense scrutiny in medi-
cine and public health, a liquid representation of  the fluidity of  
socio-cultural stigmas, norms, and values. Enlightenment scholars 
believed blood “to be the seat of  the soul.”1 In ancient Egypt 
and medieval Europe, blood was a symbol of  youth and longev-
ity. And in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a new element 
became tangled up with blood: race. Less than three decades after 
Darwin published his paradigm shifting tome, On the Origin of  Spe-
cies, his cousin Francis Galton coined the term eugenics, labeling 
it as a field that would give “the more suitable races or strains of  
blood a better chance of  prevailing speedily over the less suit-
able.”2 Early eugenicists tied blood to their theoretical principles. 
Eugenics became concerned with “improving” the human race by 
studying how traits could be passed on (or prevented from being 
passed on) to future generations, often in a way that justified racial, 
gendered, and class-based prejudice.3 Although it had its critics, 
through most of  the first half  of  the twentieth century eugenics 
was a popular field, well-regarded by scientists and laymen alike.4 
Blood was no longer a physical substance, but a potent symbol of  
lineage, race, and citizenship. 
 By the twentieth century, blood gained an additional layer 
of  symbolism as the practice of  transfusion became common-
place. Blood transfusion did not become an accepted therapeutic 
treatment until the nineteenth century, as it directly conflicted with 
the centuries-old practice of  bloodletting to cure disease.5 While 
blood transfusion was only sporadically performed in that century, 
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Karl Landsteiner’s discovery of  ABO groups in 1901 led to its 
more commonplace use in the twentieth century.6 However, 
blood transfusion was still quite rare before 1914, used only in 
the most severe cases due to its low success rate. In 1914, par-
ticularly during World War I, a coagulating agent called citrate 
was first employed. This allowed blood to last longer in trans-
port, resulting in transfusions being performed on a larger scale 
than before.7 At this time, civilian blood donation was still not 
an accepted practice, and blood was typically provided by other 
soldiers in return for rewards like extended leave.8 
 In the 1920s, voluntary, non-compensated donation be-
came the standard, but collection efforts remained uncoordinat-
ed and existed in only a few select cities and hospitals. The U.S. 
government did not establish a national-level blood collection 
program until 1940.9 As a result, the Red Cross launched a major 
civilian blood collection program in 1941.10 When Dr. Charles R. 
Drew, an African American man, developed new plasma-drying 
technology that allowed blood to be transported across states 
and oceans, blood could more regularly be transfused from one 
human to another on a mass scale. The symbolism around blood 
began to take new forms. What did it mean now that one per-
son’s blood could easily and anonymously flow into the veins of  
another? In the United States, at a time when racial segregation 
was rampant, the practice of  blood transfusion brought to the 
fore a new trajectory of  discourse regarding blood and race. 
 Using an array of  primary sources, from local periodi-
cals and advertisements to internal letters and memos from the 
Red Cross and the National Association for the Advancement 
of  Colored People (NAACP), I will trace the evolution of  this 
segregation policy and the calculated actions of  the Red Cross 
as it found itself  caught between two sides of  a burgeoning 
American war on racial segregation. Scholars such as Thomas 
Gugliemo argue that the Red Cross had a poor understanding 
of  public opinion and that its actions instead reflected many 
of  their own race-based prejudices.11 While the Red Cross did 
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indeed have difficulty reflecting public opinion, the organiza-
tion understood that it could never precisely mirror it. Instead, 
it chose to take a middle ground approach so as not to anger 
either side of  the debate and rise above racial politics. The Red 
Cross placed great value on its symbolism and the quasi-religious 
space it had carved into the psyche of  the American public. In 
an attempt to act as a supranational, post-political humanitar-
ian force, even an embodiment of  American democracy itself, 
the Red Cross promoted segregation as a social rather than sci-
entific policy, a “democratic compromise” between two wholly 
conflicting views on race. Meanwhile, local Red Cross chapters 
and everyday American citizens often found themselves deeply 
misinformed about the policy and its origins for the duration of  
the war. Year after year, the Red Cross found itself  pulled into 
the messy weeds of  American racial politics by fierce opponents 
of  segregation, from the NAACP to religious leaders and labor 
groups, unable to truly function as the apolitical humanitarian 
organization it sought to be.
 I will close with a discussion on the implications of  this 
policy of  segregation on the perception of  citizenship in the 
African American community. Sarah Chinn, in her book Technol-
ogy and the Logic of  American Racism, traces how the rhetoric of  
Red Cross officials and Red Cross advertisements contributed 
to an erasure of  black citizenship.12 I will build from this con-
cept while digging more deeply into the responses of  everyday 
black citizens to better understand their own perceptions of  the 
implication of  this debate. The stakes were further raised due to 
the backdrop of  World War II, a war fought against a German 
aggressor obsessed with ethnic purity and the racial symbolism 
of  blood. Due to the Red Cross’s policy of  blood supply segre-
gation, black Americans felt unable to fulfill their patriotic duties, 
unable to contribute to their country and its war efforts as full 
and equal citizens. In this way, black Americans became caught 
in a second symbolic war on the home front just as the United 
States found itself  fighting in a fierce battle against racialized 
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ideology abroad.
shiftiNg RespoNsibility aNd aN evolviNg policy: 
suRveyiNg the Red cRoss policy’s tRajectoRy
 As U.S. citizens started to donate blood for the war ef-
fort, even before the formal entrance of  the United States into 
World War II, some black donors reported being turned away 
by the Red Cross. At first, the Red Cross, which collected blood 
for Allied troops, did not have an official national policy on ac-
cepting black donors. In some local centers, such as those in 
Philadelphia and New York, the blood of  African Americans 
was accepted but not sent to the laboratory for processing. In 
other locations, such as Baltimore, black donors were turned 
away from the war blood donation program, and were redirected 
to the regular Baltimore-area hospital transfusion program.13
 By late August, due to the continued media publicity 
and the new recommendations from the army and navy, the Red 
Cross made it its official policy to reject black blood completely.14 
The national director of  the Red Cross’s Blood Donor Service, 
G. Canby Robinson, specified that “pursuant to the requests 
and instructions of  the Army and the Navy, and up to this time 
the Red Cross has been asked to supply only plasma from white 
donors.”15 The justification for this policy was that it would be 
“impractical” to accept blood from multiple races due to limited 
need and limited processing resources.16 This identical language 
can be found in several letters and statements sent from various 
Red Cross figures to concerned citizens and organizations.17
 The Red Cross included this exact language in their man-
ual as well. All local Red Cross chapters received a widely dis-
seminated guide entitled “Team Work from Publicity to Plasma.” 
This guide instructed local chapters on how to conduct publicity 
efforts and served as an all-inclusive manual containing official 
Red Cross collection procedures and policies. The guide explic-
itly stated that “only white donors can be taken,” again stating 
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that they were “acting pursuant to the requests and instructions 
of  the Army and Navy.”18 The guide, however, went into ad-
ditional detail: 
This position is taken because about ninety-five 
percent of  those serving in the armed forces are 
white men, who it is understood prefer plasma 
from white donors. Where transfusions are re-
quired for Negro service men, they will be given 
normal transfusions from Negro donors if  they 
do not desire to use the plasma from white do-
nors. In this way a person would have the right to 
receive blood transfusions of  the proper type, or 
plasma, as he himself  might choose.19
 Shortly afterwards, the NAACP became involved in the 
blood supply debate, viewing it as an opportunity to spread its 
message of  anti-segregation and racial equality. In December 
1941, Walter White, the secretary of  the NAACP, forwarded G. 
Canby Robinson’s official statement to the secretary of  the navy 
in order to put pressure on Robinson and receive clarification 
on the policy. By January 15 of  the next year, the navy had re-
ceived the note and Surgeon General Ross T. McIntire penned 
a reply. McIntire denied that the war department had ever been 
involved in the formulation of  the Red Cross’s policy. “So far as 
the Navy is concerned,” he began, “I wish to tell you that it has 
never requested the American Red Cross not to take blood from 
black donors.”20 McIntire described the Red Cross’s statement 
as “based upon misinformation,” noting that black donors had 
donated to the navy’s supply as recently as December 31, 1941.21
 In an effort to ascertain the Red Cross’s actual policy, 
Walter White did not hesitate to challenge the Red Cross upon 
receipt of  the letter of  denial from the navy. White forwarded 
the navy’s letter to the Red Cross and also sent it to numerous 
publications around the country. In one letter sent by White, he 
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attached the letter from McIntire and wrote, “I know this will in-
terest you in its proof  that the Red Cross has been guilty not only 
of  race prejudice but also of  falsifications.”22 The Red Cross, 
suddenly caught in an unexpected public relations predicament, 
explained in a letter from their director of  domestic operations: 
“the publicity which grew out of  the letter…is something we 
had no opportunity to deal with because we did not know that 
Admiral McIntire had written the letter.”23
 In order to dampen the effect of  White’s actions fol-
lowing the published letter from the navy, Red Cross National 
Chairman Norman H. Davis replied to White in a letter on 
January 26, 1942. He wrote: “It is true…that the Navy never 
actually requested the Red Cross to refuse to take blood from 
Negro donors,” adding the caveat that the navy had told them 
that there was “no need for Negro blood.”24 Upon hearing from 
the navy that there was no particular need for black blood, the 
Red Cross decided only to take white blood, calling it “impracti-
cal” to set up separate facilities for collecting black blood. In 
the same letter, Davis noted that due to facilities that had “con-
siderably expanded” and because of  a need for civilian transfu-
sions, “arrangements have been made…to accept the blood of  
Negro donors.”25 Davis continued to mention the navy like this 
in subsequent statements explaining this new policy, although 
he softened the language considerably. The policy was no longer 
“pursuant to the requests and instructions of  the Army and the 
Navy,” but now “in agreement with the Army and the Navy.”26
 Attached to this letter was an official statement from 
January 21 in which Davis presented the new Red Cross policy to 
accept blood from all races, but always labeled by race and “pro-
cessed separately into plasma.”27 This new policy was developed 
in a conference that included the chairman of  the Red Cross and 
the surgeons general of  the army and navy. At the conference, it 
was decided that “there was complete agreement that neither the 
Red Cross, nor the Army or the Navy could accept responsibil-
ity for mixing the [white and black] blood…It was recognized, 
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of  course, that this position would probably be attacked just as 
vigorously as our practice to this time of  not accepting Negro 
blood.”28 This new policy was an attempt at a compromise to ap-
pease both sides due to its political implications.29 Despite the ap-
pearance that this policy compromise incorporated the thoughts 
of  the army, navy, and the Red Cross, the Red Cross continued to 
attempt to diffuse blame in both public and private statements. 
In an off-the-record note to a colleague, Robinson wrote that 
“[i]f  we were instructed not to indicate Negro blood as such [by 
the army and navy], we would not do so.”30 It is clear that neither 
the Red Cross, army, nor navy wanted to take full ownership of  
the policy, contributing to the confusion surrounding it for many 
years. Davis even acknowledged in private correspondence that 
he “repeatedly told representatives of  the Negro point of  view, 
that the decision to keep plasma separate was really the deci-
sion of  the Army and Navy and that we were complying with 
their request.”31 The national Red Cross was “unwilling to have 
the Red Cross placed in the position publically of  appearing to 
disapprove a War Department policy,”32 yet at the same time it 
believed that desegregating the blood supply would lead to “a 
storm of  criticism far more difficult.”33 
 Believing that taking a firm opinion in either direction 
would result in severe controversy, the Red Cross attempted in-
stead to strike a sort of  balancing act with its policy and national 
statements, neither fully accepting ownership of  the policy nor 
fully opposing segregation. The organization kept attempting to 
shift responsibility to other parties. In 1942, it worked to modify 
legal language so that “the actual title to the whole blood will 
pass from the Red Cross to the Army at the time it is delivered 
to the processing firm,” essentially removing culpability from the 
Red Cross. Davis explicitly stated that, as a result, “the entire 
matter of  the handling the blood and processing it into plasma 
will be after the Army has assumed control so that it will be 
more accurate for us to contend that we really have nothing to 
do with whether the white and Negro plasma is mixed or kept 
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separate.”34
 Despite the Red Cross’s best efforts to tamp down nega-
tive publicity, activists saw the policy as an outright extension of  
Jim Crow racial segregation laws to the blood supply, institution-
alized by the Red Cross’s new blood donor policy.35 The news of  
this new policy was disseminated widely, even appearing in a New 
York Times article on January 29, 1942.36 The paper’s coverage 
was relatively negative, featuring a quote from a New York con-
gressman who declared the policy “abhorrent to the principles 
for which this war is being fought and on which this country was 
founded.”37 
 The muddled and inconsistent responses from both the 
national Red Cross and the military meant that the true origins 
of  this policy were unclear to everyday citizens for many weeks, 
months, and even years. While the navy had already denounced 
the Red Cross’s statement and many local chapters appeared to 
be actively accepting donations from black citizens, one union 
publication informed its members on January 22, 1942, that 
the Red Cross still barred donations from black donors per the 
army and navy’s requests.38 The origins of  the policy were also 
unclear to many citizens throughout the span of  the war.39 This 
confusion led to organizations like the National Federation for 
Constitutional Liberties accusing the Red Cross, army, and navy 
of  “repeatedly [attempting] to shift responsibility” for the policy, 
noting that even in April, the Red Cross continued to claim that 
the segregation policy was done “in accordance with [the Navy’s] 
desires.”40 Throughout the entire length of  the war, the NAACP 
continued to receive letters from citizens who were confused 
about this policy and its origins.41
blood is blood: scieNtific aNd Medical coNseNsus 
agaiNst blood supply segRegatioN
 While local justification for the policy of  segregation 
was fragmented and often uncoordinated, the national Red 
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Cross organization was more consistent. As discussed in the first 
section of  this work, each time the national Red Cross updated 
its official policy, which was quite infrequently, statements were 
brief  and contained little justificatory detail. However, other 
sources such as quotes from national Red Cross employees and 
editorials provide a better window into understanding how the 
Red Cross justified its segregation policy publically and on a na-
tional scale. 
 Some scholars have written off  the Red Cross’s segrega-
tion policy as a practical decision based on social norms without 
fully acknowledging the extent of  the controversy or the amount 
of  time the Red Cross spent agonizing over the policy.42 Other 
contemporary scholars have attempted to understand early 
twentieth-century attitudes towards non-white blood through a 
lens of  science and public health. Historian Keith Wailoo has 
extensively studied the way that African American blood was as-
sociated with certain diseases such as sickle cell anemia during 
the first half  of  the twentieth century. He explains that, by view-
ing the blood of  African Americans as a medium through which 
sickle cell was carried and spread, some physicians justified exist-
ing social views of  segregation with the scientifically dubious 
mentality that African American blood was inherently infectious 
or unclean. Despite a general consensus that sickle cell anemia 
was genetic, many physicians still believed that any exposure to 
black blood carrying sickle cell anemia, regardless of  the genetic 
makeup of  the recipient, could spread the disease.43 
 Yet, it is striking that the Red Cross did not employ any 
of  this medical or public health rationale to justify this segrega-
tion policy during World War II. In fact, most of  the major play-
ers involved in this debate, from the Red Cross to the govern-
ment to the NAACP, seemed to agree that there was no apparent 
scientific or public health rationale to segregate the blood supply. 
A representative from the Chicago chapter of  the Red Cross ex-
plained in a letter to the Chicago Civil Liberties Committee that 
all blood at the time was tested for disease and type before being 
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processed into plasma. He emphasized that “if  [a donor’s] blood 
is tainted with disease, he is notified that his blood is unsatisfac-
tory” and the blood would be rejected and not processed into 
plasma. Since all blood was rigorously tested, the Red Cross did 
not fear contamination. Rather, it was primarily concerned with 
the health of  the donor, regardless of  race.44
 Waldemar Kaempffert, the former president of  the 
National Association of  Science Writers, explained that despite 
the higher rate of  diseases like syphilis in the African American 
population, any risk was negligible due to the mandatory testing 
of  all donated blood. He then stressed that “thousands of  whites 
who have received Negro blood are alive today because there is 
no difference [in blood between races].”45 Red Cross National 
Chairman Norman H. Davis likewise told protesters that “he 
recognized the scientific fact that there is no difference between 
the blood of  Negroes and whites,”46 and Lt. Col. Kendricks of  
the Army Medical Corps agreed “that there is no scientific basis 
for segregation.”47 Journalists and activists also emphasized that 
“there is no chemical or physical difference between the blood 
of  colored persons and the blood of  other races.”48 The cartoon 
in Figure 1, created by the Congress of  Racial Equality (CORE), 
is a variation of  a common image used by activists in flyers and 
Figure 1
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newspapers, employing this scientific consensus alongside na-
tionalist pathos to protest the Red Cross’s segregation policy.
 In fact, when the Red Cross referenced science, it was 
actually to say that segregation was inconvenient. In 1941, a rep-
resentative from the Red Cross stated that since “technical pro-
cedures require mixing the blood of  donors in processing dried 
plasma…it is impractical to keep separate the blood of  particular 
individuals in this process.”49 The national technical consultant 
of  the Blood Donor Service called the segregation policy “a very 
difficult problem from a technical point of  view.”50
expaNdiNg stakeholdeRs: blood segRegatioN aNd the social 
status Quo iN the Red cRoss’s public stateMeNts
 The Red Cross, acknowledging that science would not 
be sufficient to segregate the blood supply, instead used the 
idea of  “popular will” as an expression of  democracy to justify 
their policy. When the Red Cross announced that they would 
no longer ban black blood but would still segregate the blood 
supply, in an official statement on January 21, 1942, they gave 
only the following justification: “In deference to the wishes of  
those for whom the plasma is being provided, the blood will be 
processed separately so that those receiving transfusions may be 
given plasma from blood of  their own race.”51 This argument 
proved to be highly contentious. Representative Vito Marcan-
tonio (ALP-NY) believed that “this policy of  segregating the 
blood of  black and white donors does not represent the wishes 
of  the American people.”52 One World War I veteran wrote to 
the NAACP soon after learning of  the Red Cross’s policy. He 
was extremely “troubled,” explaining, “I know that if  I needed 
a pint of  blood I would not care where it came from if  it would 
help me.”53
 Nevertheless, the Red Cross’s primary justification 
throughout the war remained the same. They never named any 
disinclinations from within the organization but rather deferred 
Penn History Review     43 
A War on Two Fronts
to other groups, such as the army and navy leadership, soldiers, 
and, more generally, “whites.” While the army and navy had 
originally denied any involvement in the segregation policy, a let-
ter in 1943 from Lt. Col. Kendricks admitted that the military 
was, in fact, involved. He explained that “there is a disinclination 
on the part of  many whites…to have colored blood injected into 
their veins,”54 without referencing any specific data or particu-
lar instance of  a soldier refusing non-white blood. A group of  
NAACP officials interviewed J. Harrison Heckman, manager of  
the North Atlantic division of  the Red Cross. He admitted that 
“soldiers and sailors had never been asked and would not be. 
The wishes were those of  the surgeons general of  the army and 
navy who…were not apt to need any transfusions.”55 In agree-
ment with this statement, there were few to no public objections 
from soldiers themselves on this issue, but rather objections 
from non-soldiers who projected their opinions onto soldiers. 
One congressman, Representative John E. Rankin (D-MS), was 
particularly outspoken. In 1944, Rankin announced that “there 
are many Southern white troops with the Allies and I resent hav-
ing the blood of  other races pumped into their veins when they 
are helpless to do anything about it.”56 
 S. Sloan Colt, national chairman of  the Red Cross’s War 
Fund Program, made the argument used by the Red Cross even 
more general, applying it to white and black Americans as a whole 
rather than just white and black soldiers. He outlined this in a let-
ter to a doctor who questioned the policy. The main paragraph 
of  his letter illuminates the expanding group of  stakeholders in 
this debate:
It is recognized that there are many persons in 
this country who object to having Negro blood 
used for the transfusion of  white persons…
When this situation is accepted it seems that the 
feelings and perhaps even the prejudices of  in-
dividuals to whom transfusions are given should 
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be respected as a symbol of  democracy. Neither 
the American Red Cross nor the Medical De-
partments of  the Armed Forces have considered 
that this feeling can be disregarded.57
This argument is a natural extension of  the way that the Red 
Cross often viewed itself—as an embodiment of  democracy. 
Red Cross pamphlets described the organization as “democracy 
in action—the people’s exemplification” and a “fusion of…di-
verse points of  view,” even claiming that “[d]ynamic American 
democracy [is] on the march under the Red Cross emblem.”58 
Various arguments were employed to justify the ban and segre-
gation of  African American blood from the Red Cross blood 
supply. Tracing this language shows that the arguments were no 
longer solely about white and black soldiers, but about white and 
black Americans across the country. Consequently, it is more ac-
curate to label the debate over the blood supply a societal one 
rather than one isolated to the Red Cross and the army alone.
 Because the Red Cross employed the broader societal 
argument that whites did not feel comfortable with the blood 
of  African Americans being transfused into white soldiers, it 
is important to understand why they used this justification, re-
gardless of  the veracity of  the claim. What made the Red Cross 
concerned about the opinions of  white Americans at large rather 
than just the opinions of  white soldiers? 
 Many in the Red Cross and the military believed that the 
viability of  the Red Cross’s blood collection operation depended 
on the support of  white America, much of  which was resis-
tant to social change. The Red Cross frequently expressed the 
concern that desegregating the blood supply would be a direct 
challenge to the United States’ “social order.” In 1942, a group 
of  Mid-Atlantic social workers were unhappy that they had to 
comply with the Red Cross’s policy of  segregation. Walter Da-
vidson, assistant manager of  the Eastern Division of  the Red 
Cross, defended the policy by stating: “we have not yet reached 
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the place in society which would permit radical social changes.”59 
The aforementioned Congressman Rankin likewise criticized a 
newspaper opposed to blood supply segregation for “[stirring] 
up race friction” rather than “[promoting] national unity.”60 To 
critics like Rankin, desegregation represented an unnecessary 
social battle that would distract from the war. 
 Even supporters of  desegregating the blood supply un-
derstood that desegregation would alter current social mores. 
They, however, saw this as a positive rather than a deleterious 
alteration. For example, a white donor wrote in a letter to the 
Chicago Daily Tribune that desegregating the blood banks would 
be an important “stepping-stone” towards a more equal social 
order. This donor argued that segregation may very well have 
been part of  the entrenched social structure in certain parts of  
the United States, but that the Red Cross was actually “extend-
ing” the reach of  segregation into a new sphere, not simply pre-
serving what already existed.61 
 Statements from the Red Cross and the U.S. military sug-
gest that they viewed objects to desegregation with concern and 
feared that desegregation could distract from their main goal: 
blood collection. Lt. Col. Kendricks explained that “whether that 
disinclination is the result of  ignorance or prejudice, it neverthe-
less exists…It is the conviction of  this office that disregard of  
this feeling would greatly mitigate against the successful conclu-
sion of  the program for collecting blood plasma for the armed 
forces.”62 Similarly, Red Cross official J. Harrison Heckman said 
off  the record in his interview with the NAACP that the Red 
Cross would only change the policy if  the blood supply some-
how depended on it. He admitted that the organization received 
many letters from concerned citizens who did not support the 
policy, in addition to complaints from nearly a hundred commit-
tees, but asserted that the Red Cross was “getting all the blood 
[they could] handle.”63 According to statements like this one, the 
organization did not mind the many complaints and bad public-
ity, since it was not hurting their donation numbers in the end. 
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In other words, the Red Cross appeared to be mostly concerned 
with its steady supply of  donations rather than accusations of  
racial discrimination. Yet this claim was likely not fully true. 
Throughout the war, the Red Cross sent letters to chapters re-
minding them of  the organization’s ambitious collection quotas, 
and the Red Cross was acutely aware of  negative publicity that 
could risk its donation numbers.64
 In a letter to NAACP cofounder Mary White Ovington, 
G. Canby Robinson continued to use this practical justification 
for their policy. He explained that the Red Cross enacted the 
original ban because they feared it “would be detrimental to the 
whole undertaking.” Robinson also stated that his organization 
had to listen to the “prejudices of  a relatively large number of  
people in this country,” as it would be “in the best interests of  
the Army and Navy from the point of  view of  successful pro-
curement of  dried plasma.”65 Even officials from the NAACP 
were concerned about the views and opinions of  racially mo-
tivated white Americans. NAACP officials in the Publicity and 
Promotion leg of  the NAACP feared publishing the words of  
Representative Rankin’s racially tinged tirade due to the fact that 
“too many people agree with Rankin and might be persuaded by 
the full text that he was right.”66 Even the official “authorized 
reply” that the national Red Cross distributed to local chapters 
used language emphasizing the success of  the blood donor pro-
gram. This authorized reply, referring to critics of  integration, 
stated: “we have no alternative but to recognize the existence of  
a point of  view which, if  disregarded, would militate against the 
effective use of  the blood plasma.”67
“the people’s exeMplificatioN”: 
the Red cRoss as a foRce “above” politics
 The national Red Cross’s extensive concern over the 
language of  democracy, public opinion, and interfering with the 
social order of  the United States reflected a larger trend in the 
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Red Cross’s continuing predicament with regards to segrega-
tion. Throughout its history, the organization often struggled to 
reconcile its own guiding principle of  neutrality with the fact 
that its interventions inevitably had political ramifications.68 
The Red Cross has historically been extremely preoccupied 
with transcending national politics, branding itself  as an extra-
governmental, almost religious force that rose above everyday 
political conflict. Yet, during World War II, segregation dragged 
the organization into the minefields of  the explosive and divisive 
national politics of  race. 
 The Red Cross was consumed on a day-to-day basis with 
its public image, particularly with cultivating a post-political im-
age. In one piece of  publicity material, the Red Cross called itself  
“the people’s exemplification” and “the Greatest Mother”—an 
amalgamation of  all members of  the United States, a representa-
tion of  “city and country people, rich and poor, white and Negro, 
capital and labor, agriculture, Protestant, Catholic, Jew.”69 The 
organization continued to cultivate this sort of  quasi-religious 
embodiment of  democracy in this same document, describing 
how all of  these diverse segments of  the United States, “by the 
alchemy of  the Red Cross emblem…become one people.”70
 The Red Cross often accused its critics of  undermining 
this self-constructed post-political image and muddying it with 
matters of  local race politics. In a letter to the New York Times 
after the publication of  an article criticizing the Red Cross’s seg-
regation policy, the director of  the New York chapter of  the Red 
Cross accused the paper of  “knowingly [seeking] to discredit 
the American Red Cross or injure an undertaking so vital to 
the welfare of  our armed forces,”71 and explained that the Red 
Cross policy was constructed for the sole purpose of  “the alle-
viation of  suffering and the conservation of  human life,” calling 
racial controversies “beyond the scope of  the Red Cross.”72 A 
newspaper article from the same year noted that one of  the Red 
Cross’s “favorite” public arguments was “that it is not its busi-
ness to settle racial controversies.”73 Indeed, in one letter the Red 
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Cross secretary explained that “[t]he Red Cross was not created 
to settle racial questions.”74 The Red Cross believed that it was 
beyond these political matters of  race. As a result, the Red Cross 
continually attempted to dodge blame for the policy and justify 
its actions with the vague language of  public opinion in an effort 
to sustain its image as an embodiment of  democracy.
 For the duration of  the war, the Red Cross was continu-
ally preoccupied with matters of  public opinion. Each year from 
1942 until 1946, the Red Cross commissioned Gallup polls in or-
der to gauge public opinion. These polls were national in scope. 
Notably, the polling results were classified as confidential. The 
polls referenced other competitor relief  organizations such as 
the Salvation Army, and the Red Cross believed that this “might 
be considered controversial.”75 In its effort to classify these polls, 
the Red Cross was again attempting to maintain an air of  partial-
ity and apoliticism, above inter-organizational squabbling. 
 The Red Cross saw the importance of  maintaining posi-
tive public relationships with the black press and black America 
more broadly, as criticisms from the black press would inevita-
bly bleed into the consciousness of  the white reading public. 
One national Red Cross employee wrote in an internal letter: 
“The press has so frequently called the attention of  the colored 
reading public to what it alleges to be discriminatory practices 
on the part of  the Red Cross that the average lay citizen reads 
and examines every publication that is published in the name of  
the American Red Cross with critical eyes.”76 Another employee 
noted that “practically all of  the complaints [sent to the national 
Red Cross] related to the separation of  the blood from white 
and Negro donors.”77 The national organization believed that 
the segregation of  the blood supply represented one of  the Red 
Cross’s major obstacles in transcending politics and matching 
public opinion.
 It became apparent to members of  the national Red 
Cross that because of  the issue of  segregation, it would be im-
possible to perfectly match public opinion and fully transcend 
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national politics. The Red Cross could neither appease segrega-
tion-supporting whites nor appease America’s black population 
with any single policy. Jesse O. Thomas, assistant to the vice 
chairman of  domestic services to the Red Cross, described this 
predicament in a frustrated letter to the Red Cross’s public rela-
tions department:
It will be difficult to make any statement that will 
stand up against critical analysis and yet maintain 
the position we occupy…It is a controversial 
question in which we find ourselves essaying 
to reflect public opinion. I am not sure that we 
know what is the public’s opinion. Under these 
circumstances we will have to assume that our 
opinion is the public’s opinion…If  no white 
Americans choose to go with [the Negro]…he 
could not threaten our security nor could his 
unsympathetic attitude do us much harm. Of  
course if  the labor organizations and a consider-
able section of  the white community should join 
him in protest, it would create a somewhat dif-
ferent situation. Only a Solomon could be wise 
enough to give the answer.78
a WaR oN tWo fRoNts: 
blood supply segRegatioN aNd WaR RhetoRic
 For many Americans, the stakes of  the debate over the 
blood supply were significantly heightened due to its concur-
rence with World War II. In Europe, Allied troops were fighting 
against a dictator obsessed with blood purity and erasing non-
whiteness. Opponents of  the Red Cross were not hesitant to 
draw parallels between that organization and the Axis powers.
 The NAACP drew these parallels quite frequently, view-
ing this comparison as a point of  weakness that could be used 
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to pressure the Red Cross and draw a war-engulfed public to the 
anti-segregation side. In December 1941, when black blood was 
still totally banned, the NAACP issued a press release utilizing 
this sort of  war rhetoric against the Red Cross. The press re-
lease featured Dr. James J. McClendon, president of  the Detroit 
branch of  the NAACP, who stated that he saw “very little dif-
ferent between the Hitler-like tendencies in Germany and the 
Hitler-like tactics of  the American Red Cross in refusing to take 
Negro blood.”79 McClendon then utilized  more wartime rheto-
ric, calling it “deplorable that democracy should maintain such 
inconsistencies during this time of  national emergency” and 
adding that “the need for national unity should overshadow the 
prejudices which the Army and Navy persist in maintaining.”80 
Since the Red Cross used an argument of  personal preference 
as an expression of  democracy, the NAACP and other critics 
viewed this as an opportunity to reverse the language and use it 
against the Red Cross to portray it as “undemocratic” or “un-
American.” This specific press release makes significant use of  
these themes, with one paragraph as a particularly salient repre-
sentation of  the NAACP’s overall rhetorical strategy: 
We feel that in a national emergency, such as this, 
we can ill afford to practice the same undemo-
cratic principles that Hitler and Mussolini are 
practicing overseas. We understand that we are 
fighting against racial hatred, bigotry, and totali-
tarianism. It seems rather strange to us that if  we 
are fighting against those things, why we should 
practice them here at home.81
 The NAACP continued to use very strong anti-Axis 
language in its writings. Walter White, in a letter to Chairman 
Davis, excoriated the policy. He wrote, “how ironic must be the 
laughter today in Berlin and Tokyo as they listen to American 
assertions that the war is being fought against the racial ideology 
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of  aryanism and to wipe out totalitarianism based on racial big-
otry.”82 In its letters and press releases of  this nature, the NAACP 
was relentless and continuous. Over three years later, almost im-
mediately after Davis was replaced by Basil O’Connor as Red 
Cross chairman, the NAACP released a press release calling on 
the new chairman to immediately reverse the blood segregation 
policy. The statement noted that “our Axis enemies have used 
this policy of  segregation to convince colored peoples of  the 
world that our country is not sincere when it says that it is fight-
ing against the racial theories of  Adolph Hitler while at the same 
time it practices a similar master race theory.”83
 While this language may at first appear to be overly 
dramatic, comparing the Red Cross and America’s genocidal 
opponents was fairly common, even among those who did not 
work for the NAACP, such as Red Cross volunteers and donors. 
Mabel K. Staupers, the executive secretary of  the National As-
sociation of  Colored Graduate Nurses and famous opponent 
of  the racial segregation of  nurses in the armed forces,84 made 
this comparison in a letter to the Red Cross. In her letter, she 
included a “small donation” and noted that she had “been try-
ing very hard to get other donations but the Red Cross attitude 
towards Negroes in relation to the Blood Bank has been most 
disastrous.”85 She closed her letter with a criticism of  the Red 
Cross through war rhetoric similar to that of  the NAACP: “This 
recent announcement of  labeling the blood—Negro and White 
is adding insult to injury and I am sure that it must give great 
satisfaction to the Totalitarian Powers who in their attitude to-
wards minority groups have claimed that they are copying the 
American Pattern.”86 Stauper’s statement added a financial ele-
ment to the war rhetoric, explaining that the segregation policy 
was undermining the Red Cross’s fund collection efforts.
 Even the famed American poet Langston Hughes used 
war rhetoric to put pressure on the Red Cross. In a letter to the 
Red Cross War Fund Authors’ Division, Hughes wrote: “Hitler 
could hardly desire more. General Douglas MacArthur may be 
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right when he says, ‘The Red Cross never fails a soldier.’ Cer-
tainly it has failed thirteen million Negroes on the home front, 
and its racial policies are a blow in the face to American Negro 
morale.”87 Hughes forwarded the letter to his acquaintance Wal-
ter White of  the NAACP, who lauded it.
 In another letter to the Red Cross, Dr. Ephraim Kahn, 
president of  a New York association of  medical students and 
physicians that offered assistance to the Red Cross, used similar 
language. Noting the “scientific stupidity” of  the segregation 
policy, Kahn wrote, “We are Americans engaged in a bitter war 
with those tyrants who seek to foist barbaric race theories upon 
the world, and as such we are indignant at the undemocratic and 
fascist implications of  your policy.”88 Another letter writer, the 
executive secretary of  the Urban League of  Cleveland, claimed 
that the segregation policy would actually prolong the war by 
dividing the allies and creating “obstacles to that real national 
unity without which our struggle may be unnecessarily long and 
bloody.”89 These two quotes take the war rhetoric used in previ-
ous examples even further, actively accusing the Red Cross of  
undermining national unity and hurting the war effort, not sim-
ply critiquing them for promoting racist policies. 
 A column in the weekly newsletter of  the Greater New 
York Federation of  Churches compared Hitler’s “doctrine of  
Aryan blood supremacy” to the Red Cross’s policy of  blood 
supply segregation.90 Likewise, an article in the Jewish newsletter 
The Reconstructionist called it “a sin against democracy to keep alive 
the myth of  racial characteristics inherent in the blood stream,” 
built upon “Nazi mythology of  Aryan preeminence.”91 Another 
religious figure, Henry Smith Leiper, complimented the Red 
Cross’s efforts in a letter but wrote that he felt “that the situation 
is intolerable at a time when we are fighting Hitlerism with its 
grotesque race theory, the central item in which happens to be 
in complete accord with the nonsense about racial blood that is 
perpetuated here through such policies.”92 From religious figures 
and NAACP members to concerned everyday civilians, letters 
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with war rhetoric put pressure on the Red Cross from a diverse 
array of  backgrounds.93 
 E. Frederic Morrow, NAACP field secretary and future 
major in the army, wrote a letter to the editor of  the Bergen Eve-
ning Record, a New Jersey newspaper, making an emotional call 
to fight this war on race on multiple fronts. It is an example that 
takes these rhetorical strategies to the extreme, comparing not 
just the Red Cross with the Germans, but more broadly apply-
ing the debate over the blood supply to racial injustice across 
the United States and the world. It shows not only the powerful 
rhetorical strategies used by the NAACP and others to put pres-
sure on the Red Cross, but also alludes to the emotional stakes 
of  this policy battle and its implications for millions of  black 
citizens in all spheres of  American society. It sheds light on why 
the NAACP made this blood supply policy one of  the organiza-
tion’s main ideological battlegrounds of  World War II:
As we go, we want our citizens conscious that 
we cannot defeat Hitlerism leaning on the black 
crutch of  invidious color distinctions in our na-
tional life. We want America to realize that we 
can win the war abroad, but lose it at home, un-
less we simultaneously crush the little Hitlers and 
their fascist tendencies here in this land. We want 
honest agreement that if  pogroms are wrong 
in Poland, so are lynchings wrong in America. 
If  forced labor is an evil in Czechoslovakia, so 
are peonage farms in Georgia. If  badges of  ra-
cial distinction are damnable in Germany and 
France, so are Jim-Crow arrangements in the 
United States. This fight for freedom for people 
everywhere must start right here at home. And 
the time is now!94
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blood doNatioN as a leNs foR 
uNdeRstaNdiNg black peRceptioNs of citizeNship
 During World War II, the Red Cross was a familiar 
household name, found in all corners of  popular media. The 
publicity wing of  the national Red Cross was extremely active, 
even creating sample advertisements to send to local newspapers 
for publication.95 The national organization developed publicity 
guides along with cartoons, stories, photo spreads, testimonials, 
and other forms of  advertisement so that local chapters could 
work with local newspapers to advertise for blood donation.96 
Newspapers and radio shows, from local radio stations to popu-
lar periodicals like Parents’ Magazine, Ladies’ Home Journal, Town & 
Country, and Redbook, regularly announced when organized Red 
Cross blood drives were taking place and ran ads, articles, and 
shows encouraging readers/listeners to donate blood.97 It was 
not uncommon to read an article about a group of  colleagues 
Figure 2 Figure 3
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taking a break during the working day to donate blood.98 One 
Cincinnati radio station began to air a weekly Sunday night se-
ries that would “include dramatizations from the home and war 
fronts” to encourage listeners to donate to the Red Cross.99 A 
Chicago radio station did the same three times per week.100 An-
other Baltimore station aired a similar nightly program where 
“listeners [were] urged to call in during the broadcast and ver-
bal arrangements [were] made over the air for the blood dona-
tions.”101 Broadcasts and radio programs like these could be 
found around the country.102 
 Advertisements explicitly used the Red Cross to pro-
mote their products. An advertisement for Julianna housecoats 
in Vogue told readers that “a half-hour in a rest-inducing Julianna 
housecoat will restore you to normal after your Red Cross blood 
donation.”103 In Billboard magazine, J.P. Seeburg Corporation, a 
Chicago musical instrument maker, bought a full-page advertise-
ment encouraging everyday citizens “to give all that is humanly 
possible in work…in bonds…in blood donations…in all patri-
otic activities…until a final Allied Victory is achieved.”104 
 To activists, the ubiquity of  the Red Cross in the con-
sciousness of  everyday Americans—due to popular media, 
government propaganda, and otherwise—provided an opening 
for fighting segregation in a space that was very familiar to the 
American public. To black Americans, this ubiquity represented 
a direct challenge to their citizenship. Advertisements telling citi-
zens it was their duty to donate blood were extremely common-
place, yet black Americans were told they could not contribute 
on this front; they were either barred from donating or had their 
blood segregated in the process.
 One poster (Figure 2) directly compared fighting in bat-
tle and donating blood. It read: “He gave his blood. Will you give 
yours?” Another poster (Figure 3) used the language of  recruit-
ment to encourage citizens to donate blood, telling donors to 
“Enlist…As a Red Cross Blood Donor,” just as a soldier would 
“enlist” in the war. Posters like these demonstrate that donating 
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blood was a contribution equated with fighting in battle. One 
article in Vogue magazine told readers that “your blood is in the 
war” and that “in your arteries is the power to give men a sec-
ond chance to live,” directly comparing donors to soldiers on the 
battlefield and encouraging them to donate.105 Since blood dona-
tion was so often described as having near equivalent importance 
to physically fighting in battle, the blood donation restrictions on 
African Americans represented a direct challenge to their ability 
to contribute to the war in the same way that white Americans 
could.106
 Blood segregation became a very visible and widespread 
issue for African Americans. The NAACP considered it one of  
its top concerns with the Red Cross. Secretary White emphasized 
that until blood plasma was desegregated, everything else “would 
be futile in winning the goodwill of  Negroes, so stirred are they 
by the segregation of  Negro blood.”107 On July 15, 1942, the Red 
Cross brought black leaders from across the country to the or-
ganization’s Washington headquarters. At this conference “it was 
made clear to the Red Cross administrators that the segregation 
of  Negro blood in the blood plasma project was the principal 
thing affecting adversely the Negro’s morals today.”108
 This ban caused such a visceral response from black 
Americans because it deprived them of  the chance to serve their 
country. The contributions of  African Americans, if  not out-
right rejected, were labeled and marked separately in a way that 
showed that even in their blood they were not equal citizens and 
could not give to their country like white Americans could. As 
described by E. Frederic Morrow, African Americans “want, and 
demand all the responsibilities, as well as privileges of  citizen-
ship.”109 The segregation of  the blood supply diminished these 
responsibilities.
 After donating, one African American man heard that 
black blood was being rejected and wrote to the Red Cross. He 
said he hoped they would accept his blood, “by an American 
for the use of  Americans.”110 Black workers at the New York 
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City Department of  Welfare described to the NAACP how “the 
establishment of  a discriminatory blood donor station in of-
fices where whites and Negroes work together is embarrassing 
and humiliating.”111 In another instance, the NAACP followed a 
group of  African Americans who hoped to donate their blood 
only to be rejected. One woman, the president of  the American 
Federation of  Teachers, stated that she was “humiliated” by not 
being permitted to donate.112 Dr. James J. McClendon described 
how his patients and friends, many of  whom were teachers, at-
tempted to donate their blood “for the American Soldier,” only 
to be rejected. He described them as “fine, loyal, American col-
ored people” who were “insulted and humiliated” by the ban.113 
 In another instance, Alva B. Johnson, an administrator 
of  a historically black college in West Virginia, described how 
he was perturbed by a message in the weekly newsletter of  his 
hometown of  Langhorne, Pennsylvania. The message called on 
“all white patriotic citizens who wish to donate blood report to 
the Community House at a certain date,”114 with no announce-
ment following regarding black blood donors. Johnson was par-
ticularly bothered by the fact that the announcement referred to 
the community house, a public building. This correspondence 
raises the broader question of  what it means to be part of  a com-
munity. Articles such as this one excluded African Americans 
from the perceived community, a smaller instance of  the larger 
issues raised by the segregation of  the blood supply.
 One element that heightened the stakes of  the debate 
was the fact that blood donation practices regarding race changed 
once the United States entered a state of  war. One letter from a 
New York City hospital explained that before the war they per-
formed “at least 1,400 transfusions each year,” all of  which were 
done “without regard to race or color.”115 Then suddenly, during 
a time of  war, millions of  African Americans were banned from 
doing what they had always done. When the stakes moved from 
aiding fellow private citizens to contributing on a larger scale to 
the country’s war efforts, African Americans were banned from 
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doing so and later segregated from participating fully. It was no 
longer just about donating blood, it became a matter of  the gov-
ernment excluding “more than ten per cent of  its population 
from the opportunity to join in giving their blood to save our 
way of  life.”116 In many ways, the segregation of  the blood sup-
ply paralleled the fight against segregation in the armed forces. 
Just as those at home hoped to contribute to the war effort 
through blood donation but were either banned or segregated in 
the process, many black men were turned away from the armed 
forces, and those who did enter lived and operated in segregated 
conditions, often in service rather than fighting units.117 In her 
book Black Soldiers and Civil Rights, Christine Knauer argues that 
the relegation of  black men to service roles “was a manifestation 
of  black men’s perceived inferiority”118 and that “the claim for 
full and equal citizenship…was deeply interwoven with military 
service.”119 She argues that as these soldiers returned home, they 
carried back with them their mistreatment, “[spurring] black ac-
tivism.”120 The fight over the segregation of  the blood supply 
was in many ways the translation of  this issue to the home front. 
Just as their brothers and fathers were fighting for the right to 
shed blood abroad in the name of  their country, so too were 
many fighting for the exact same right at home. The denial of  
the right of  black Americans to contribute on all fronts during 
the war only intensified the battle over segregation in the country 
in the years leading up to the civil rights movement. 
 It is evident that the Red Cross did not segregate the 
blood supply out of  an explicit desire to promote racial segrega-
tion in American society. Rather, the organization saw segrega-
tion as the path of  least resistance in an effort to collect blood 
for wounded Allies while simultaneously promoting itself  as a 
humanitarian organization above the fray of  everyday politics. 
The Red Cross’s ultimate desire was to embody American de-
mocracy. In doing so, it co-opted one of  the country’s deep 
institutional racial injustices by perpetuating American society’s 
dark traditions of  segregation. The Red Cross was not acting in 
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a sinister, coordinated effort to oppress black Americans, but 
rather was subtly perpetuating structural racism on a vast scale 
through what was ostensibly a noble effort to save lives. In the 
twentieth century, African Americans were linked to the diseases 
of  syphilis and sickle cell anemia, which affected the way that 
African Americans were treated. In the late twentieth and twen-
ty-first centuries, AIDS has often been closely associated with 
gay men—it was and still is often referred to as a gay disease or 
gay-related disease.121 There are deep connections between the 
segregation of  the blood supply in the 1940s and modern-day 
bans on blood donation. Jessica Martucci, in her article “Nego-
tiating Exclusion,” explains that “keeping the blood supply safe 
in America has always been a process of  donor exclusion,”122 but 
with varying repercussions over time. She closes her article by 
claiming that “there is something unquestionably powerful about 
the claim of  biological citizenship that makes the biomedical and 
health policy realm an increasingly active one for making citizen-
ship claims.”123
 While the plight of  African Americans in the 1940s as 
it relates to the blood supply is in no way fully comparable to 
modern-day examples, it is impossible to ignore the parallels and 
to not consider the deeply powerful symbolism of  blood dona-
tion and what it means to participate in society with all of  the 
privileges and responsibilities of  a full citizen. A quote from an 
article in the National Medical Association’s 1942 publication by 
its president provides a powerful perspective on the societal and 
emotional stakes of  blood donation:
[T]hese thirteen millions of  Negroes… are loyal 
to the core. They along with other citizens of  
this country, know that for them as for whites, to 
lose this war means that all is lost that is worth 
living for. They are ready and willing to sacrifice 
the very extreme in helping to win the war. There 
is a big difference between bodily and spiritual 
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service. The body and the spirit should go to-
gether. Such acts as [the blood supply segrega-
tion] kill the spirit. They wound the very soul.124
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